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LEGAL INFORMATION, THE CONSUMER LAW 
MARKET, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
Renee Newman Knake* 
 
“[L]aw is basically information.”1 
 
“[T]he creation and dissemination of information are speech within the 
meaning of the First Amendment.”2 
INTRODUCTION 
If “law is basically information,”3 does it follow that legal information is 
“speech within the meaning of the First Amendment”?4  If so, to what 
extent may government constitutionally regulate the creation and 
dissemination of legal information, particularly by lawyers?  The answers to 
these questions hold significant implications for lawyer regulation, the 
consumer law market, and First Amendment jurisprudence. 
The consumer law market—i.e., those individuals who do not qualify for 
legal aid and are unwilling or unable to pay for an attorney who charges 
three figures per hour for multiple hours—has long been denied affordable, 
accessible, widely adopted legal services.  According to some estimates, 
this is as much as 80 percent or more of the American population.5  Every 
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 1. Larry Ribstein, New Yorker Captions and the Law, TRUTH ON MARKET (Sept. 10, 
2011), http://truthonthemarket.com/2011/09/10/new-yorker-captions-and-the-law/. 
 2.  Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2667 (2011). 
 3. Ribstein, supra note 1. 
 4.  Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2667. 
 5. See COMM. ON EQUAL ACCESS TO LEGAL SERVS., REPORT ON INVESTIGATION OF NEED 
AND ASSESSMENT OF RESOURCES 7 (2001), available at http://www.nlada.org/DMS/
Documents/1003937509.62/VT%20FINALRPT.pdf (reporting that a survey of low-income 
Vermonters demonstrated that only nine percent of respondents with legal problems received 
legal help); D. MICHAEL DALE, LEGAL NEEDS OF LOW INCOME HOUSEHOLDS IN MONTANA 
12 (2005), available at http://www.nlada.org/DMS/Documents/1149970443.85/MT%
20LNS%20Full_Report.pdf (concluding that, overwhelmingly, households in Montana with 
legal problems do not resolve them with a lawyer’s assistance); SUPREME COURT OF GA. 
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decade going back to Karl Llewllyn’s call in the 1930s for lawyers to “find 
the customer who does not know he wants it and mak[e] him want it,”6 
members of the profession have bemoaned the plight of the average 
American who likely does not even recognize that he has a legal problem, 
let alone the financial or informational resources to secure legal assistance.  
Yet, no comprehensive reform has occurred over the years to improve the 
conditions of the consumer law market. 
At the same time, information has become increasingly available more 
cheaply than ever before.7  Technology is enhancing our capacity to gain 
meaning from vast quantities of data in a range of domains from medicine 
to national security.8  Even the legal industry itself is in the midst of what 
has been called “law’s information revolution,” a label for “the growth of 
new markets for law-related information and advice. . . .  [A] legal 
information industry in which legal information factories replace the sole 
proprietors and worker cooperatives that traditionally have delivered legal 
services.”9  Nevertheless the consumer law market lags behind other 
industries in access to user-friendly, customer-driven information.10  In this 
Article, I posit that one reason for this is the way lawyers are regulated, and 
I examine whether the First Amendment might offer constitutional grounds 
for liberalizing lawyer professional conduct rules to enhance access to legal 
information. 
In Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., a recent U.S. Supreme Court decision 
involving pharmaceutical data, Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the 
six-to-three majority, declared that “the creation and dissemination of 
                                                                                                                                                     
EQUAL JUSTICE COMM’N, CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF LOW AND MODERATE INCOME HOUSEHOLDS 
IN GEORGIA:  A REPORT DRAWN FROM THE 2007/2008 GEORGIA LEGAL NEEDS 
STUDY 27 (2009), available at http://www.georgiacourts.org/files/legalneeds_report_2010
%20final%20with%20addendum.pdf (finding that over 80 percent of households in Georgia 
did not seek legal help when facing legal issues); DEBORAH RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE 3 
(2004) (“According to most estimates, about four-fifths of the civil legal needs of the poor, 
and two- to three-fifths of the needs of middle-income individuals, remain unmet.”). 
 6. K. N. Llewellyn, The Bar’s Troubles, and Poultices—and Cures?, 5 L. & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 104, 115 (1938) (“[S]pecialized work, mass-production, cheapened production, 
advertising and selling—finding the customer who does not know he wants it, and making 
him want it:  these are the characteristics of the age.  Not, yet, of the Bar.”). 
 7. See, e.g., Lucas Mearian, By 2020 There Will Be 5,200 GB of Data for Every Person 
on Earth, COMPUTERWORLD (Dec. 11, 2012, 5:29 AM), http://www.computerworld.com/s/
article/9234563/By_2020_there_will_be_5_200_GB_of_data_for_every_person_on_Earth?p
ageNumber=1 (“During the next eight years, the amount of digital data produced will exceed 
40 zettabytes . . . estimated to be 57 times the amount of all the grains of sand on all the 
beaches on earth.”). 
 8. See, e.g., Steve Lohr, Sizing Up Big Data, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2013, at F1. 
 9. Bruce Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Law’s Information Revolution, 53 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 1169, 1171–72 (2011). 
 10. Travel, medicine, retail, and other personal services industries have experienced 
wide-scale expansion and democratization from the free flow of information via the internet 
over the past two decades, but this is not yet the case for legal services, though recent 
investment into legal start up businesses offers promise for the consumer law market. See, 
e.g., Joshua Kubicki, 2013 Was a Big Year for Legal Startups; 2014 Could Be Bigger, TECH 
COCKTAIL (Feb. 14, 2014), http://tech.co/2013-big-year-legal-startups-2014-bigger-2014-02 
(“Roughly $458 million was invested into legal startups in the last year by investors.  This is 
a remarkable increase from the $66 million invested in 2012.”). 
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information are speech within the meaning of the First Amendment.”11  
This raises new questions for regulators and courts about the First 
Amendment and legal information produced by lawyers, especially in the 
context of the consumer law market.  Should rules that compromise the free 
flow of legal information be subject to a heightened review comparable to 
strict scrutiny, the intermediate scrutiny of commercial speech, some other 
sort of review, or not be treated as speech at all?  This answer turns on the  
production and dissemination of the speech as much as the content of the 
speech itself. 
This Article is the first to evaluate the impact of Sorrell on lawyers’ 
monopoly over certain forms of legal information and in First Amendment 
jurisprudence as it relates to lawyer speech more broadly.12  Contra 
regulators of the legal profession and those who believe such information 
ought not be fully protected,13 I argue that the creation and dissemination of 
legal information by lawyers14 warrant heightened protection in certain 
instances, a conclusion with significant consequences for a number of 
lawyer professional conduct rules addressing advertising/solicitation, 
ownership, multidisciplinary practice, geographic practice restrictions, and 
unauthorized practice of law. 
The Article proceeds as follows.  Part I endeavors to define what 
constitutes legal information and to identify ways in which the free flow of 
this information from lawyers is constrained by professional discipline rules 
and other regulations.  Part II analyzes the current level of First Amendment 
coverage and protection for legal information produced by lawyers.  I 
explain why legal information created and disseminated by lawyers is 
covered by the First Amendment and then turn to the more nuanced and 
complex question of the protection warranted.  Here I propose a normative 
framework drawn from an information-driven and competence-focused 
understanding of the First Amendment for resolving tensions between the 
competing goals of free-flowing public knowledge and reliable disciplinary 
expertise.  Part III identifies existing professional conduct regulations 
vulnerable to challenge as unconstitutionally infringing upon the creation 
                                                                 
 11.  Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2667 (2011). 
 12. For a detailed overview of First Amendment jurisprudence in the context of lawyer 
regulation, see W. Bradley Wendel, Free Speech for Lawyers, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 305 
(2001). 
 13. See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 
748, 781 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE 
PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 123, 127 (1993) (suggesting that nonpolitical speech like 
advertising receive reduced First Amendment protection); C. Edwin Baker, Commercial 
Speech:  A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62 IOWA L. REV. 1, 3 (1976) (“[T]he existing 
form of social and economic relationships in the United States [requires] a complete denial 
of first amendment protection for commercial speech.”); cf. Rodney A. Smolla, Information, 
Imagery, and the First Amendment:  A Case for Expansive Protection of Commercial 
Speech, 71 TEX. L. REV. 777, 780 (1993) (“Commercial speech, as speech, should 
presumptively enter the debate with full First Amendment protection.”). 
 14. My focus here is government regulation of lawyers’ creation and dissemination of 
legal information.  To be sure, nonlawyers can and do create and disseminate legal 
information—the First Amendment’s application to this sort of information raises interesting 
questions worthy of attention but beyond the scope of this Article. 
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and dissemination of legal information, including the ban on nonlawyer 
ownership/investment, geographic licensing restrictions, limitations on 
advertising and solicitation, and unauthorized practice of law statutes.  
Based upon the First Amendment doctrine and economic theory—which 
lends further support to the constitutional justifications for liberalizing 
lawyer regulation to facilitate the free flow of legal information—the 
Article concludes by identifying a number of lawyer conduct rules in need 
of reform to address the problematic lack of legal information available to 
and accessed by the consumer law market. 
I.  WHAT IS LEGAL INFORMATION? 
What constitutes legal information?  A precise definition is difficult to 
provide, especially given that new forms of information are continually 
expanding via increasingly sophisticated data production and artificial 
intelligence developments.15  Others have identified three broad categories 
of legal information.16  The first is documents or products sold to users, 
including “contracts, software for rendering automated legal advice, and 
legal codes.”17  Under this label I would add nonautomated but 
standardized18 legal material that is otherwise commoditizable and scalable 
in a mass-delivery setting, as well as lawyer blogs and other print and 
electronic resources that provide information about law.19  “Legal ideas” 
comprise the second category, for example the “‘poison pill’ takeover 
defense in corporate law” or “legal methods including jury selection, 
insuring against professional liability claims, and tax-avoidance.”20  The 
third category is what might be classified as legal financials:  legal 
information “used to make money in capital markets . . . [where] sellers are 
not creating a product or document but rather hope to use legal information 
by trading securities.”21  Legal information may come from lawyers and, 
importantly, nonlawyers alike.  For purposes here, my focus is on legal 
information that is created and disseminated by lawyers. 
A number of professional conduct regulations impede the free flow of 
legal information from lawyers.  Some of these are professional competence 
rules, defining the essence of what it means to practice law, i.e., unique 
                                                                 
 15. See generally Daniel Martin Katz, Quantitative Legal Prediction—or—How I 
Learned To Stop Worrying and Start Preparing for the Data-Driven Future of the Legal 
Services Industry, 62 EMORY L.J. 909 (2013). 
 16. See Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 9, at 1174. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Geoff Hazard, Russ Pearce, and Jeff Stempel make the distinction between 
“individualized” and “standardizable” advice, which “depends primarily on the degree of 
risk that the particular legal problem poses for the client. . . .  [where] risk is a function of 
(1) the gravity of the consequences to life, liberty, or property that might ensue if the legal 
service does not favorably resolve the matter in question, and (2) the probability that one or 
more of these consequences will actually occur.” Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Russell G. Pearce 
& Jeffrey W. Stempel, Why Lawyers Should Be Allowed To Advertise:  A Market Analysis of 
Legal Services, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1084, 1091 (1983).  Standardizable advice would fall 
under my definition of what constitutes legal information. 
 19. See discussion infra Part II.A. 
 20. Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 9, at 1174, 1180. 
 21. Id. 
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legal analysis and advice tailored to a specific set of facts, attorney-client 
confidentiality, and avoidance of conflicts of interest.  These sorts of 
regulations on lawyer speech are necessary to promote and preserve 
“democratic competence” and “disciplinary knowledge,”22 i.e., regulation 
that enables members of the legal profession to provide the specialized legal 
analysis and advice that their clients can trust and rely upon. 
Other regulations cover the organizational structure of law practice and 
the distribution of legal services.  These organization and distribution rules 
have less to do with the essence of lawyering and are more aptly described 
as bearing on the economics of law practice.  These include the ban on 
nonlawyer ownership or investment in law firms, the ban on 
multidisciplinary partnerships, geographic practice restrictions, limits on 
advertising and solicitation, and some elements of unauthorized practice of 
law statutes. 
Lawyer regulators historically have treated the professional competence 
rules and the organization/distribution rules as identical in terms of how 
their constraint of speech operates under the First Amendment.  Regulators 
(in contrast with the Supreme Court) have not prioritized the value of legal 
information to the consumer law market.  Until the 1960s and 1970s, the 
dominant view was that legal information is not speech or, to the extent that 
it may be, that the First Amendment does not protect legal information from 
regulation governing the organizational form for production or distribution. 
This perspective began to evolve as lawyers, faced with constraints on 
their ability to provide legal information to unserved or underserved 
markets, found success in liberalizing professional regulations via First 
Amendment challenges.  In 1963, the Supreme Court decided NAACP v. 
Button,23 the first of these challenges.  There, the Court held that the 
Virginia State Bar could not ban civil rights lawyers from informing 
individuals about their constitutional rights.  Over a decade later, in Bates v. 
State Bar, the Court extended its then emerging commercial speech doctrine 
to protect the dissemination of legal information about attorney fees posted 
in a newspaper in the late 1970s.24  In the wake of Bates, the Court took up 
a number of lawyer speech restrictions, sometimes siding with the 
regulators to uphold speech restrictions25 and frequently not,26 mostly in the 
                                                                 
 22. See ROBERT C. POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, ACADEMIC FREEDOM:  A FIRST 
AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE MODERN STATE 96 (2012). 
 23. 371 U.S. 415 (1963). 
 24. Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977). 
 25. See, e.g., Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324 (2010) 
(holding that a state may mandate an advertising disclosure for lawyers providing 
bankruptcy-related services); Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 620 (1995) 
(holding that a thirty-day prohibition on direct-mail solicitation by lawyers of personal injury 
or wrongful death clients withstood First Amendment scrutiny); Zauderer v. Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S 626, 655 (1985) (holding that disciplinary rules could 
mandate disclosure regarding payment of costs in advertisement, but that First Amendment 
protected attorneys so long as advertisement was truthful and nondeceptive); Ohralik v. Ohio 
State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 449 (1978) (upholding a ban on in-person solicitation of 
personal injury victims). 
 26. See, e.g., Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002) (applying 
strict scrutiny to hold that a rule prohibiting attorneys and judges running for judicial office 
2848 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82 
context of advertising, client solicitation, and advice giving.  In each of 
these cases, the Court has focused heavily on the public’s informational 
interest.  Lawyer regulators, however, as well as most First Amendment 
theorists, have failed to fully appreciate the free speech value of legal 
information to the public, especially the consumer law market. 
While the public’s right to receive information has long been a central 
concern for the Supreme Court, especially in the context of legal services, 
as well as consumer goods and other professional services,27 by contrast, 
the legal profession adheres to regulations that severely limit legal 
information from lawyers made available to the public.  The Court has used 
the public’s informational interest as justification to strike down numerous 
regulations banning truthful information from reaching the consumer 
market, starting in the mid-1970s with abortion procedures,28 prescription 
drugs,29 and legal services,30 followed by an array of other kinds of 
information ranging from utility promotions31 to commercial handbills32 to 
liquor prices.33  At the same time, lawyer regulators have refused to 
liberalize professional conduct rules in ways that could benefit the 
consumer law market.34  It has been nearly fifty years since the Court took 
its proconsumer stance in Bates; the recent decision in Sorrell offers 
                                                                                                                                                     
from speaking their views on legal or political issues violated the First Amendment); Legal 
Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 547–49 (2001) (applying heightened scrutiny to 
hold that a federal statute prohibiting Legal Service Corporation attorneys from challenging 
the validity of welfare laws violated the First Amendment); Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 642–43 
(holding that restrictions on attorney advertising and solicitation violated the First 
Amendment); In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 206 (1982) (same); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 
437–40 (1978) (same); Bates, 433 U.S. at 384 (same); Button, 371 U.S. at 437 (applying 
strict scrutiny to hold that rule prohibiting the NAACP from advising and assisting potential 
litigants to bring desegregation suits violates the First Amendment). 
 27. See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 822 (1975) (“The advertisement . . . did more 
than simply propose a commercial transaction.  It contained factual material of clear ‘public 
interest.’”).  As Justice Blackmun explained in his written preargument memorandum for a 
later case, “The emphasis in Bigelow was on the public and its right to receive information.” 
LINDA GREENHOUSE, BECOMING JUSTICE BLACKMUN:  HARRY BLACKMUN’S SUPREME COURT 
JOURNEY 119 (2006); see also Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, Commerce & 
Communication, 71 TEX. L. REV. 697, 730 (1993) (“The ‘informational function’ is central 
to the Court’s approval of commercial expression as a form of protected speech.”). Collins 
and Skover state that “of the major commercial speech cases in which governmental 
regulation has been invalidated, nearly all ‘involved restrictions on either purely or 
predominantly informational speech, such as the bans on price advertising.’  By comparison, 
governmental regulations were sustained in cases not involving ‘predominantly 
informational advertising.’” Id. (quoting David Hays Lowenstein, “Too Much Puff”:  
Persuasion, Paternalism and Commercial Speech, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1205, 1229 (1988)). 
 28. Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 825–26. 
 29. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 
(1976). 
 30. See Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass’n, 486 U.S. 466, 472 (1988) (holding that a categorical 
ban on direct-mail solicitation targeting potential clients with specific legal claims violated 
the First Amendment); Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977) (holding that categorical 
ban on lawyer advertising violated the First Amendment). 
 31. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 
(1980). 
 32. See City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 424–25 (1993). 
 33. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 503 (1996). 
 34. See infra Part III. 
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possible grounds for expanding consumer interests in the legal information 
market. 
II.  IS LEGAL INFORMATION SPEECH? 
The First Amendment provides, in relevant part, that “Congress shall 
make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . or the right of the 
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress 
of grievances,”35 and is made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.36  Does this constitutional protection encompass legal 
information when it is produced by lawyers? 
The short answer is yes, at least in some instances.  For over half a 
century, the Court has recognized some forms of lawyer speech as covered 
by the First Amendment, and through the years has derived a complex37 
framework of constitutional protection for various categories including 
legal advice,38 advertising,39 solicitation,40 statements to the press,41 bar 
admission and licensing,42 and government attorneys.43  The protection 
includes the right: 
 of civil rights lawyers to advise prospective litigants “of their 
constitutional rights, urging them to institute litigation of a particular 
kind, recommending particular lawyers and financing such 
litigation”;44 
 of union members to “maintain and carry out their plan for advising 
workers who are injured to obtain legal advice”;45 
 to “hire attorneys . . . to assist . . . in the assertion of [one’s] legal 
rights” for union members’ workers compensation claims;46 
                                                                 
 35. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 36. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 37. Some would say not only complex, but confusing and convoluted. See, e.g., Wendel, 
supra, note 12, at 312 (“[D]ecisions by courts considering free speech arguments by lawyers 
are surprisingly out of touch with the mainstream of constitutional law.”). 
 38. See Renee Newman Knake, Attorney Advice and the First Amendment, 68 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 639 (2011). 
 39. See, e.g., Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.C. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324 
(2010); Peel v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Comm’n, 496 U.S. 91, 100 (1990); In 
re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S 
626 (1985); Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 383 (1977). 
 40. See Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995); Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass’n, 
486 U.S. 466 (1988); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 
436 U.S. 447 (1978); United Transp. Union v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 576 (1971); United Mine 
Workers of Am. v. Ill. State Bar Ass’n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967); Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Va. 
State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429 (1963). 
 41. See Gentile v. State Bar, 501 U.S. 1030 (1991); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 
(1964). 
 42. See Keller v. State Bar, 496 U.S. 1 (1990); Law Students Civil Rights Research 
Council, Inc. v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154 (1971); In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82 (1961); 
Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36 (1961); In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622 (1959); 
Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252 (1957). 
 43. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 
(1983). 
 44. Button, 371 U.S. at 447 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 45. Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen, 377 U.S. at 8. 
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 to undertake “collective activity . . . to obtain meaningful access to the 
courts[, which] is a fundamental right within the protection of the First 
Amendment”;47 
 to publish “truthful advertisement concerning the availability and 
terms of routine legal services”;48 
 to “advise[] a lay person of her legal rights and disclos[e] in a 
subsequent letter that free legal assistance is available”;49 
 of an attorney to list “the areas of his practice, . . . the courts and States 
in which he had been admitted to practice,”50 and “certified legal 
specialist”51 on letterhead; and 
 of an attorney to mail announcement cards to the public52 as well as 
letters “to potential clients who have had a foreclosure suit filed 
against them.”53 
That certain forms of lawyer speech are covered54 by the First Amendment 
is a relatively uncontroversial observation given this history. 
The more complex answer lies in assessing the level of protection 
warranted by different kinds of legal information, particularly when the 
legal information is created and disseminated by an attorney.  For example, 
elsewhere I have suggested that a heightened, strict scrutiny type of review 
should be applied to congressional constraints on legal advice.55  Under this 
framework, a restriction on legal advice satisfying the standards of 
Brandenburg v. Ohio56 (i.e., legal advice “directed to inciting or producing 
imminent lawless action and . . . likely to incite or produce such action”57) 
or advice to affirmatively engage in criminal or fraudulent activity (but not 
about engaging in criminal or fraudulent activity—a fine line, to be sure) 
would be constitutional, provided the restriction preserves the ability to 
                                                                                                                                                     
 46. United Mine Workers of Am. v. Ill. State Bar Ass’n, 389 U.S. 217, 219 (1967). 
 47. United Transp. Union v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 576, 585 (1971). 
 48. Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977). 
 49. In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 414 (1978). 
 50. In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 204 (1982). 
 51. Peel v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Comm’n, 496 U.S. 91, 97 (1990). 
 52. In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 204. 
 53. Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass’n, 486 U.S. 466, 469 (1988) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). But see Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995) (upholding a Florida Bar 
rule banning lawyers from mailing letters to personal injury or wrongful death victims within 
thirty days of the accident). 
 54. The practice of law is what Robert Post would characterize as a discipline “regarded 
as contributing to the value of democratic competence [that] will receive First Amendment 
coverage, as distinct from First Amendment protection.” POST, supra note 22, at 96.  This 
means that government regulation “will raise First Amendment issues that must be resolved 
by distinctive First Amendment doctrinal tests.” Id.  This is not to say that the state cannot 
regulate lawyer speech, but that the state must prove its purpose “whenever it seeks to 
manipulate the creation and diffusion of disciplinary knowledge.” Id. at 98. 
 55. See, e.g., Knake, supra note 38. 
 56. 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam). 
 57. Id. at 447. 
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offer advice about good faith challenges to the law.58  On the other side of 
the spectrum, a blanket ban on legal advice to engage in legal activity or to 
exercise political rights clearly would be constitutionally problematic.59  
But these are the easy types of cases.  What about the more difficult cases? 
A.  Legal Information As Speech 
A common thread among the various categories of legal information—
legal documents, legal products, legal ideas, legal financials, public legal 
education, and some forms of legal advice—is that each is at least partially 
commercial in nature, whether explicitly as a product or service for sale or 
implicitly as inducement to use a particular product or service.  For this 
reason, broadly speaking, one might characterize legal information as 
falling into the Supreme Court’s commercial speech framework—i.e., 
speech that proposes a commercial transaction or is otherwise financially 
motivated.  Financially motivated information is not removed from the 
ambit of the First Amendment simply because of its commercial nature.  In 
the early 1970s, the Virginia Weekly published an advertisement on behalf 
of the Women’s Pavilion of New York City containing information about 
the availability of legal abortions in New York.60  The newspaper’s editor-
in-chief, Jeffrey Bigelow, was convicted in Albemarle County Circuit Court 
for violating a Virginia statute criminalizing the publication of an 
advertisement for “the procuring of an abortion or miscarriage.”61  Bigelow 
appealed, arguing that the statute infringed on his free speech rights.62  The 
Supreme Court ultimately declined to address this issue, finding his claim 
moot in light of subsequent amendments to the statute by the Virginia 
legislature,63 but Justice Blackmun’s seven-to-two opinion sheds light on 
understanding the scope of First Amendment protection for legal 
information.  First, he noted, “The existence of ‘commercial activity, in 
itself, is no justification for narrowing the protection of expression secured 
by the First Amendment.’”64  Importantly, the Court identified an 
informational interest that extends beyond an individual targeted by an 
advertisement to include “those with a general curiosity about, or genuine 
interest in, the subject matter or the law of another State and its 
                                                                 
 58. Id.  A version of this restriction exists throughout the country—every jurisdiction 
has adopted a rule based upon MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2013) which 
provides, in relevant part: 
A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the 
lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer may discuss the legal 
consequences of any proposed course of conduct with a client and may counsel or 
assist a client to make a good faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning 
or application of the law. 
Although California is an exception in not having adopted Model Rule 1.2 specifically, the 
legislature has enacted a similar type of provision for legal advice. See CAL. RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3-210 (“Advising Violation of Law”). 
 59. See Knake, supra note 38, at 698. 
 60. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 811–12 (1975). 
 61. Id. at 813. 
 62. Id. at 815. 
 63. Id. at 818. 
 64. Id. (quoting Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 474 (1966)). 
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development, and to readers seeking reform.”65  Thus, for the Court, “[t]he 
policy of the First Amendment favors dissemination of information and 
opinion,”66 and as a corollary, the Court has found that there is a “First 
Amendment right to ‘receive information and ideas,’ and that freedom of 
speech ‘necessarily protects the right to receive [this information].’”67 
The Court’s application of commercial speech scrutiny functions on an 
intermediate level, something less than political speech’s strict scrutiny but 
something more than simply a rational basis.68  The test as articulated in 
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission 
requires that “[i]f the communication is neither misleading nor related to 
unlawful activity, the . . . State must assert a substantial interest to be 
achieved by restrictions on commercial speech.”69  The Supreme Court has 
used this test in examining restrictions on attorney advertising the same way 
that it has done for other regulated industries.70  Despite a seemingly clear-
cut test, the line between commercial speech and political speech is hazy, 
particularly so when it involves information that goes to the heart of our 
democratic form of government.  In my view, “access-to-the-law or 
delivery-of-legal-services speech in many ways serves the same function as 
political speech,”71 even if it also has an advertising or marketing element, 
and ought to be treated as political speech even if it is delivered via a 
commercial process or if it demands financial support for effective 
dissemination.72  Commercially delivered speech can be as important—
perhaps even more important—than the proverbial street corner soapbox 
                                                                 
 65. Id. at 822. 
 66. Id. at 829 (citation omitted). 
 67. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 
757 (1976) (quoting Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762–63 (1972)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 68. It may be that certain of the professional conduct restrictions discussed herein as 
susceptible to a First Amendment challenge fail even to survive rational basis review.  For 
example, Cassandra Burke Robertson offers a compelling argument that no rational basis 
exists for the corporate practice doctrine restriction on nonlawyer ownership of law practices 
in her article Private Ordering in the Market for Professional Services, 94 B.U. L. REV. 179 
(2014). But see Lawline v. Am. Bar Ass’n, 956 F.2d 1378 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that 
Model Rules 5.4(b) and 5.5(b) are rationally related to the legitimate state interests of 
safeguarding the public, maintaining the integrity of the legal profession, and protecting the 
administration of justice, and that there was no First Amendment violation in prohibiting 
association of nonlawyers in partnership with lawyers); Turner v. Am. Bar Ass’n, 407 F. 
Supp. 451 (N.D. Tex. 1975) (finding no violation of nonlawyers’ First Amendment rights in 
a ban on partnership between a lawyer and nonlawyers). 
 69. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980). 
 70. See, e.g., Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 623–24 (1995) (“First, the 
government must assert a substantial interest in support of its regulation; second, the 
government must demonstrate that the restriction on commercial speech directly and 
materially advances that interest; and third, the regulation must be ‘narrowly drawn.’” 
(quoting Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. 564–65) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Cent. 
Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564–65. 
 71. Renee Newman Knake, Democratizing the Delivery of Legal Services, 73 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 1, 25 (2012). 
 72. See MARTIN H. REDISH, MONEY TALKS:  SPEECH, ECONOMIC POWER, AND THE 
VALUES OF DEMOCRACY 2 (2001) (“In light of modern economic realities and the structure of 
modern communications, expression often requires significant financial resources in order to 
be effective.”). 
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speaker’s political commentary.  This was Justice Harry Blackmun’s view 
over three decades ago in Bates and his view has been carried forward by 
the modern Court, most recently by Justice Kennedy in the recent decision 
Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc. 
B.  Sorrell v. IMS Health and Its Implications for Legal Information 
In Sorrell, the Court seemingly expanded First Amendment coverage by 
holding that “the creation and dissemination of information are speech 
within the meaning of the First Amendment” deserving of a heightened 
protection beyond that traditionally accorded to commercial speech.73  The 
2011 decision involved a Vermont statute banning the sale (or gifting) of 
physician prescription records by pharmacies or data miners absent 
physician permission.74  The information was highly valuable for 
commercial purposes to companies marketing pharmaceutical drugs to 
doctors and patients, and for that reason, might have been treated as 
commercial speech.75  Nevertheless, the Court applied a “heightened” level 
of review to strike the state law.76  The decision has generated a good deal 
of debate, along with many questions about how, precisely, the Court’s free 
speech jurisprudence may evolve to cover data and information in the 
future. 
Some contend that the Sorrell decision signals the demise of the 
commercial speech doctrine.77  Others argue that the majority got it wrong 
and, presumably, they expect a correction to occur as more First 
Amendment challenges involving data and information reach the Court.78  
Regardless of whether the commercial speech doctrine lives on in some 
form or not, however, the Court is likely to continue to face additional 
disputes related to how society values access to and receipt of information, 
particularly as technology allows for the increased production of cheaper 
and more nuanced data streams along with more sophisticated knowledge 
about the meaning of mass quantities of information and data.  If it is 
                                                                 
 73. Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2659, 2667 (2011) (“Speech in aid of 
pharmaceutical marketing, however, is a form of expression protected by the Free Speech 
Clause of the First Amendment [and] . . . must be subjected to heightened judicial 
scrutiny.”). 
 74. Id. at 2659. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 2667. 
 77. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Over the Cliff, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 24, 2011, 9:00 PM), 
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/08/24/over-the-cliff/?_r=0 (“It is an article of 
faith within the Roberts court majority that of course corporations have full speech rights 
when it comes to public affairs—and they have something rapidly approaching full speech 
rights when it comes to selling their wares as well, since the doctrine hammered out during 
the Burger years that recognized ‘commercial speech’ but assigned it a lower level of 
protection is close to collapse.  It’s all just speech now.”). 
 78. See, e.g., Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 232 (1985) (White, J., concurring) (“Just as 
offer and acceptance are communications incidental to the regulable transaction called a 
contract, the professional’s speech is incidental to the conduct of the profession.”); Tamara 
R. Piety, “A Necessary Cost of Freedom”?  The Incoherence of Sorrell v. IMS, 64 ALA. L. 
REV. 1, 2 (2012) (“The notion that unrestrained freedom for commercial speech is a 
‘necessary cost of freedom’ is not just wrong, it is dangerously wrong.”). 
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correct that freedom of speech covers the creation and dissemination of 
information as a general matter, does it not likewise cover the creation and 
dissemination of information about law?  And how might this impact the 
way lawyers are regulated in their dissemination of legal information? 
To the extent Sorrell is the new standard, a number of regulations 
covering the organizational form of law practice and distribution of legal 
services may be constitutionally vulnerable.  This view is strengthened in 
light of the majority opinion in Citizens United v. FEC, which expanded 
First Amendment protection for corporations on the same terms as 
individuals79 and broadened prior decisions related to increasing the free 
flow of speech to further economic competition.80  In shielding the method 
for creating and disseminating speech produced as part of a regulatory 
scheme, as well as the speech itself, from government interference, the 
Court not only rejected Central Hudson’s balancing approach but also 
recognized the modern realities of information access and delivery.  
Protecting the mode of transmission is as important as protecting the 
content. 
John McGinnis’s property-based understanding of the First Amendment 
offers useful insight here particularly because it situated within an 
information-driven understanding of the First Amendment.81  According to 
McGinnis, a “property-rights vision” of the First Amendment “would 
immunize commercial speech from regulation unless it threatens property 
through force or fraud.”82  His critique of the Central Hudson test is that it 
“does not require that the regulation of speech be premised on some threat 
to property or life,” which means “it can be applied to restrict even truthful 
advertising of the opportunity to engage in otherwise legal conduct.”83  
Under McGinnis’s view, “[b]y narrowly circumscribing regulatory power 
over speech to that necessary to prevent harm to life or property, a property-
based interpretation of the First Amendment would lead to greater 
opportunities for commercial uses of the emerging information 
communication networks.”84  The informational interests at stake drive 
McGinnis’s position. 
                                                                 
 79. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 315 (2010) (“[T]he Government may not 
suppress political speech on the basis of the speaker’s corporate identity.  No sufficient 
governmental interest justifies limits on the political speech of nonprofit or for-profit 
corporations.”).  “The Court has thus rejected the argument that political speech of 
corporations or other associations should be treated differently under the First Amendment 
simply because such associations are not ‘natural persons.’” Id. at 343; see also Knake, 
supra note 71 (arguing that, under Citizens United, corporations have a First Amendment 
right to engage in the delivery of legal services). 
 80. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 363–64. 
 81. John O. McGinnis, The Once and Future Property-Based Vision of the First 
Amendment, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 49, 56 (1996). 
 82. Id. at 128. 
 83. Id. at 128–29. 
 84. Id. at 129.  This conceptualization of the First Amendment is consistent with the 
conception of the lawyer’s specialized role in the preservation of democratic government. 
See, e.g., Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Future of Legal Ethics, 100 YALE L.J. 1239, 1246 
(1991) (“The lawyer’s work consists of resistance to government intervention in the lives, 
liberty, or property of private parties.”). 
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For most citizens, information is consumed in direct proportion to its 
entertainment value.  For this reason, says McGinnis, as with “other 
products, information will have to be attractively packaged to gain a wide 
audience, and, as with other products, private entrepreneurs are likely to be 
more successful than government at doing this, even when packaging public 
policy information.”85  Thus, regulation that prevents or limits the capacity 
of an information provider to engage in this sort of marketing and branding 
would violate the First Amendment.  Furthermore, as McGinnis observes, 
“the regime of property rights in information transmission does its best to 
ameliorate civic ignorance.  As the owners of information compete to 
package it in a form in which citizens will be interested, information 
becomes more accessible.”86  Ultimately, under his “property-rights 
regime,” informational, commercial speech warrants the same level of 
scrutiny as political or artistic speech, which is essentially the result in 
Sorrell. 
In short, under this view, organization and distribution rules wholly 
foreclosing a particular avenue for providing legal information would not 
be sustainable under a property-based, information-driven understanding of 
the First Amendment, though disclaimer requirements keyed to fraud and 
force might be.  This fails to account, however, for regulations  constraining 
lawyer speech to cultivate and preserve democratic competence and 
disciplinary knowledge, such as American Bar Association (ABA) Model 
Rule of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6 on attorney-client confidentiality87 
or Rule 3.6 on statements about pending cases and trial publicity.88  Under 
an information-driven prioritization alone, it would be difficult to justify the 
degree of restriction on an attorney’s speech that is necessary to preserve 
these obligations.  This does not necessarily mean the First Amendment 
forecloses the state’s capacity to regulate; rather, we must explore the 
constitutional values at stake and the degree of regulation warranted. 
The balance between public access to knowledge about law generally and 
individual access to uniquely tailored advice and advocacy is delicate.  
Robert Post observes, “To preserve the self-government of the people, we 
must preserve their access to knowledge.  We must safeguard their 
democratic competence,”89 which means there are times where the First 
Amendment contemplates restrictions upon speech for this purpose.  As 
Post explains, his term “[d]emocratic competence refers to the cognitive 
empowerment of persons within public discourse, which in part depends on 
their access to disciplinary knowledge.  Cognitive empowerment is 
necessary both for intelligent self-governance and for the value of 
                                                                 
 85. McGinnis, supra note 81, at 122 (“Moreover, the property-centered information 
regime, unlike the regulatory regime of current self-governance theorists, recognizes that the 
prospect of being entertained is most likely to entice citizens to become informed citizens in 
the first place.”). 
 86. Id. at 126. 
 87. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2013). 
 88. See id. R. 3.6. 
 89. POST, supra note 22, at 95. 
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democratic legitimation.”90  For Post, “[d]emocratic legitimation requires 
that the speech of all persons be treated with toleration and equality.  
Democratic competence, by contrast, requires that speech be subject to a 
disciplinary authority that distinguishes good ideas from bad ones.”91  He 
believes that the “commercial speech doctrine is best explained as resting 
on the constitutional value of democratic competence,”92 and that “[t]here 
are also scattered court decisions that serve this same value by protecting 
the distribution of disciplinary knowledge outside of public discourse.”93  
Post points out that, at times, regulation is necessary in order to secure 
democratic competence through expert knowledge because “[b]y 
guaranteeing that clients can plan to rely on expert professional judgment, 
law endows such communication with the status of knowledge.”94 
This intersection between commercial speech and disciplinary knowledge 
elucidates the magnitude of the public’s interest in free-flowing legal 
information.  Post’s democratic competence-centered approach reveals why 
the First Amendment permits some regulation of lawyer speech to protect 
clients and to facilitate competent legal representation.  Moreover, 
regulation must be designed to incentivize legal training such that a lawyer 
can recoup the time and expense of having acquired the specialized 
professional skill.  In other words, some constraint on lawyer speech is 
necessary to protect and cultivate the special attributes comprising the 
professional capabilities of what it means to be a lawyer.95 
C.  The Value of Legal Information to the Consumer Law Market:  Hunter 
v. Virginia State Bar As a Case Study 
To understand the First Amendment’s application in the context of legal 
information for the consumer law market, consider Horace Frazier Hunter, a 
Virginia criminal defense lawyer who authored a blog called This Week in 
Richmond Criminal Defense.96  Hunter blogged primarily about his own 
criminal cases.  He wrote about repeated successful resolutions, both 
settlements and trials.  Though he posted about his cases, at least in part, for 
the purpose of attracting new clients, he did not include the advertising 
disclaimer required by the Virginia State Bar, i.e., a line stating that 
previous results are not predictors of future success.  In writing about his 
cases, Hunter used the real names of real clients who were acquitted or who 
                                                                 
 90. Id. at 33–34. 
 91. Id. at 34. 
 92. Id. at 35. 
 93. Id. (“[These decisions] yield the unexpected conclusion that our First Amendment 
has been interpreted to shield from unchecked political control the authoritative disciplinary 
practices that produce expert knowledge.”). 
 94. Id. at 45. 
 95. See, e.g., Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 9, at 1218 (“[A]ccess must be balanced 
with creation incentives through such mechanisms as fair use and mandatory licensing 
rules.”); Jane Yakowitz Bambauer, Is Data Speech?, 66 STAN. L. REV. 57, 112 (2014) 
(“Seclusion is not the only legitimate basis for limiting the creation or dissemination of data.  
The public’s interest in the confidentiality of certain special relationships . . . can be a 
compelling reason . . . .”). 
 96. Hunter v. Va. State Bar, 744 S.E.2d 611, 614 (Va. 2013). 
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received favorable plea bargains as a result of his negotiations.  He admitted 
that he used clients’ names without their consent.  Notably, all of the 
information he placed on his blog could also be found in the public record 
of criminal proceedings.  In essence, Hunter served as a curator of the 
information and a facilitator for the free flow of legal information. 
The Virginia State Bar disciplined Hunter for disseminating this legal 
information via his blog.  Hunter received a public reprimand, and appealed 
on First Amendment grounds.  The Virginia Supreme Court agreed with 
Hunter’s argument that blogging is protected free speech and reversed the 
discipline, though treated it as commercial speech, which could be subject 
to the disclaimer requirement but not banned entirely.97  In other words, the 
court held that the bar may not ban attorneys from describing public facts 
even if they are potentially embarrassing or harmful to the client, and even 
absent client consent, so long as the facts are not protected by attorney-
client privilege. 
In reaching this result, the court prioritized the general availability of 
information about legal services over an individual client’s expectation of 
confidentiality,98 a conclusion that has sparked considerable outrage.99  The 
Virginia State Bar had urged the court to adopt its interpretation of an 
attorney’s confidentiality obligation as “prohibit[ing] an attorney from 
repeating truthful information made in a public judicial proceeding even 
though others can disseminate this information because an attorney 
repeating it could inhibit clients from freely communicating with their 
attorneys or because it would undermine public confidence in the legal 
profession.”100  Rejecting the bar’s view, the court declined to permit 
privacy, confidentiality, and public confidence considerations to trump the 
distribution of legal information to the public once the representation has 
concluded.101 
Hunter provides an interesting case for reflection upon the nature of legal 
information and its importance to the public consumer law market. The 
legal information at issue in Hunter—facts about completed criminal law 
cases—is available in the public record, even without Hunter’s 
involvement.  Yet the information takes on enhanced meaning because of 
the way it is disseminated, and by whom—here, a lawyer.  When Hunter 
blogs, he increases the amount of free-flowing information about law in the 
public sphere.  Rather than sitting in some obscure court file, the 
                                                                 
 97. Hunter had argued that his blogging constituted political speech, even though a 
component of it was marketing. See id. at 622. 
 98. See id. at 620 (“To the extent that the information is aired in a public forum, privacy 
considerations must yield to First Amendment protections.”). 
 99. See, e.g., Andrew Perlman, More on the Confidentiality Implications of 
Hunter v. Virginia State Bar, LEGAL ETHICS F. BLOG (June 9, 2013, 8:20 PM), 
http://www.legalethicsforum.com/blog/2013/06/hunter_case.html (“At the recent ABA 
National Conference on Professional Responsibility, one of the panels focused on the Hunter 
case.  I think it’s fair to say that many members of the audience were somewhat critical of 
the Court’s decision.  Many of us thought that we would have to rethink the scope of a 
lawyer’s duty of confidentiality if the case’s reasoning is widely followed.”). 
 100. Hunter, 744 S.E.2d at 620. 
 101. Id. 
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information is now curated, pieced together with the most relevant and 
interesting facts, posted in a targeted way for a mass audience.  Hunter’s 
blog serves numerous functions—advertising and marketing,102 education 
about legal entitlements and obligations,103 news reporting,104 and criticism 
of the legal system105 to name a few.  His blog may be increasing the 
likelihood that an individual facing a criminal sanction will hire an attorney, 
thereby reducing search costs.  Hunter may very well also be gathering 
information about potential clients based upon their visits to his blog site to 
help ascertain their legal needs.  In terms of quality, Hunter’s blog becomes 
something of a self-policing tool; Hunter is engaged in branding through 
dissemination of information about his legal work and has an interest in 
maintaining a particular public image.  This incentivizes quality 
representation so as to not compromise his brand reputation.  His use of real 
client names and stories lends credibility and legitimacy.  Finally, because 
he is blogging as a lawyer, he likely increases the possibility that 
individuals with a legal problem will read the information. 
The Hunter opinion generated strong reactions from scholars, regulators, 
and lawyer ethics experts, many of them unfavorable.106  These critics take 
the position that lawyers must adhere to the duty of confidentiality even at 
the expense of disseminating truthful, public legal information.107  A 
primary justification for this viewpoint is a desire to encourage clients’ full 
and frank disclosures to their attorneys under the cloak of confidentiality.  If 
clients fear their attorneys may discuss public facts about their case, so the 
argument goes, clients may be less than forthcoming in sharing information 
essential to the representation.  This position fails, however, to recognize 
the value of legal information to others who may benefit and learn about 
their own legal needs.  It also fails to consider that clients with legal 
problems may have strong incentives to fully disclose their situations even 
without confidentiality protections.108  This calculus leaves no room for 
acknowledging the public’s interest in the dissemination of legal 
information found in court records.  Critics say, “The fact that the 
information is available to the public doesn’t mean it is known by the 
public.”109  But it seems this is precisely the point for the court in Hunter:  
legal information ought to be more available to those who currently lack it, 
not less so.  This prioritization of interests is consistent with the First 
                                                                 
 102. Id. at 617; id. at 622 (Lemon, J., dissenting in part). 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. See, e.g., Richard Zitrin, Viewpoint:  Guard Your Clients’ Public Secrets, 
RECORDER, June 7, 2013, at 6, 6; Richard Zitrin, Viewpoint:  Court Struggles To Regulate 
Attorney Blogging, U. CAL. HASTINGS C.L. (May 17, 2013), http://www.uchastings.edu/
news/articles/2013/05/zitrin-attorney-blogging.php. 
 107. See Margaret Tarkington, A First Amendment Theory for Protecting Attorney 
Speech, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 27 (2011); Zitrin, supra note 106 (arguing that an attorney 
must “maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself or herself to preserve 
the secrets, of his or her client”). 
 108. See Daniel R. Fischel, Lawyers and Confidentiality, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 1 (1998). 
 109. Id. 
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Amendment’s interest in the free flow of information.  This suggests the 
attorney may very well be best situated for disseminating Hunter-type 
information in order to help the public address its legal information needs.  
The decision strikes a difficult balance between preserving the attorney-
client relationship (for example, only publicly available, nonprivileged 
information may be discussed by the attorney after conclusion of the 
proceedings—all other nonpublic information remains subject to Rule 1.6 
confidentiality protections and Rule 3.6 trial publicity limitations) and 
promoting the distribution of public legal information, furthering both the 
administration of justice and public understanding of the legal system as a 
whole.  Admittedly, this is a shift away from a loyalty-driven paradigm of 
the lawyer-client relationship toward an enhanced legal information 
marketplace for the public.  The Hunter court espouses a world where 
loyalty is prioritized for the duration of the matter but then subordinated to 
public informational interests at the conclusion of the representation.  This 
result seems driven by the public’s legal information interests first 
articulated in Bates and, perhaps, further supported by, the Court’s 
protection of the creation and dissemination of information in Sorrell. 
III.  THE FUTURE FOR LAWYER REGULATION IN A POST-SORRELL WORLD 
To the extent I am correct in suggesting that the creation and 
dissemination of legal information by lawyers is covered speech, several 
existing professional regulations are constitutionally vulnerable. 
A.  Nonlawyer Ownership/Investment and  
Multidisciplinary Partnership Bans 
The ABA has long opposed external ownership and investment by non-
lawyers into law firms, a position embodied in Model Rule 5.4.110  The 
Rule dates to the 1920s,111 though the ban originated in a 1909 New York 
criminal statute enacted out of competitive concerns from individual 
lawyers who feared corporations contracting with lawyers to offer bulk 
legal advice by subscription.112  The prohibition has continued even in the 
face of regular debate over its efficacy and purpose throughout the decades.  
In the 1960s, one critic suggested that both “courts, as well as the bar 
associations, have too frequently been guided by the literal application of 
negative limitations without inquiring into the affirmative purposes which 
                                                                 
 110. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4 (2013).  Model Rule 5.4 mandates, “A 
lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees with a nonlawyer” and “shall not form a 
partnership with a nonlawyer if any of the activities of the partnership consist of the practice 
of law.” Id.  The Rule further provides, “A lawyer shall not practice with or in the form of a 
professional corporation or association authorized to practice law for a profit if . . . a 
nonlawyer owns any interest therein” or “a nonlawyer is a corporate director or officer.” Id. 
 111. See CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS Canon 33 (1928) (amended 1937).  For more on the 
history of the rule, see Edward S. Adams & John H. Matheson, Law Firms on the Big 
Board?:  A Proposal for Nonlawyer Investment in Law Firms, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1998). 
 112. See Bruce A. Green, The Disciplinary Restrictions on Multidisciplinary Practice:  
Their Derivation, Their Development, and Some Implications for the Core Values Debate, 
84 MINN. L. REV. 1115, 1126–28 (2000). 
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the limitations are intended to aid or into the new conditions and situations 
under which novel problems are presented.”113  Nevertheless, members of 
the bar in considering at the time whether a corporation might own a law 
firm “stated that ‘no amount of data could justify’ a plan then under 
consideration for a new form of bringing legal services to the middle 
classes.”114  Again, the concept was dismissed in the 1980s under a “fear of 
Sears” argument, the idea that legal services offered by a mass retailer such 
as Sears would fundamentally compromise lawyers’ capacity to 
competently and ethically serve clients.115  Most recently, while the ABA’s 
Commission on Ethics 20/20 (20/20 Commission) at one point approved the 
drafting of a proposed change to Model Rule 5.4 that would allow law firms 
to include nonlawyers in minority ownership roles, the revision ultimately 
was rejected.116  To date no state courts or bar authorities have engaged in a 
successful effort to liberalize the nonlawyer ownership or multidisciplinary 
partnership restrictions (beyond Washington, D.C.’s very limited exception 
that permits multidisciplinary practices among lawyers and nonlawyers117).  
Only one state legislature has considered the issue, but the bill to enable up 
to 49 percent nonlawyer ownership died in committee.118 
The plaintiffs’ law firm Jacoby & Meyers recently filed lawsuits in 
Connecticut, New Jersey, and New York attacking the ban on First 
Amendment and other constitutional grounds.119  The firm asserts that, “to 
                                                                 
 113. ELLIOTT CHEATHAM, A LAWYER WHEN NEEDED 81 (1963). 
 114. Id. (quoting Report of the Special Committee on Legal Clinics, 65 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 
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 116. See Ted Schneyer, “Professionalism” As Pathology:  The ABA’s Latest Policy 
Debate on Nonlawyer Ownership of Law Practice Entities, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 75, 137 
(2012) (“I was disappointed that the 20/20 Commission decided not to recommend our 
proposal for adoption by the ABA House of Delegates.  Our Draft Resolution and Draft 
Report remain in the ABA archives, but no relaxation of the ban on nonlawyer ownership of 
law firms by the ABA or state supreme courts seems likely in the short term—unless, of 
course, the ban is struck down in litigation.”). 
 117. See Unauthorized Practice/Fee Splitting, [Practice Guides] Laws. Man. on Prof’l 
Conduct (ABA/BNA) 91:402 (2014) (explaining that apart from one exception (the District 
of Columbia), few significant variations from Model Rule 5.4(b) or (d) have arisen in the 
states that have based their ethics rules on the Model Rules).  While the District of Columbia 
permits certain multidisciplinary practices, it does not authorize external ownership of a law 
firm.  For example, the ability of a corporation to provide legal services. See D.C. RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4(b). 
 118. See An Act to Allow Nonattorney Ownership of Professional Corporation Law 
Firms, Subject to Certain Requirements, S. 254, 2011–2012 Gen. Assemb., 2011 Sess. (N.C. 
2011), available at http://www.ncleg.net/Sessions/2011/Bills/Senate/HTML/S254v0.html. 
 119. In May 2011, Jacoby & Meyers filed three lawsuits challenging the external 
ownership/investment ban in ABA Model Rule 5.4 in New York, New Jersey, and 
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ensure the public’s greatest possible access to legal representation and 
protection of their rights through the civil justice system in an affordable, 
cost-effective way, Jacoby & Meyers requires a substantial infusion of new 
capital,” but due to Rule 5.4 and related provisions it has been “relegated to 
obtaining capital from (i) the personal contributions of the partners, 
(ii) retained earnings on fees generated and collected, and (iii) commercial 
bank loans, which invariably come with onerous interest rates.”120  These 
options “for capital infusion are either too expensive or unavailable,” and 
the firm “has been unable to entertain the numerous offers it has received 
from prospective non-lawyer investors . . . who are prepared to invest 
capital in exchange for owning an interest in the firm.”121  As such, the 
lawsuit contends that “restrictions on the ability of firms to provide legal 
representation, and on non-lawyers to economically associate with lawyers 
for that purpose, are impermissible restrictions on First Amendment 
rights.”122 
The policy underlying the resistance to a corporate ownership structure 
for law firms has been couched largely in terms of professionalism and 
lawyer independence.  This is explicit on the face of the rule (entitled 
“Professional Independence of a Lawyer”123) and implicit in the debates 
and commentary about the purpose of the rule over the years.124  According 
                                                                                                                                                     
Connecticut. Jacoby & Meyers Files Landmark Suits in 3 States To Overturn Laws 
Restricting Access to Capital for Law Firms, LEGAL ACCESS FOR ALL (May 18, 2011), 
http://legalaccessforall.org/; see also Mark Hamblett, Suit Challenges N.Y. Prohibition of 
Non-lawyer Firm Ownership, N.Y. L.J., May 20, 2011, at 1, 5.  At the time of this writing, 
the New Jersey litigation had been remitted by the U.S. District Court for the District of New 
Jersey to the Supreme Court of New Jersey for review. See Sindhu Sundar, NJ Judge 
Won’t Toss Outside Investor Law Firm Suit, LAW360 (Mar. 7, 2012, 5:29 PM), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/317067/nj-judge-won-t-toss-outside-investor-law-firm-suit.  
A motion to dismiss pending in the District of Connecticut remained undecided. Cf. 
Transcript of Oral Argument, Jacoby & Meyers Law Offices, LLP v. Judges of the Conn. 
Superior Court, No. 3:11CV817(RNC) (D. Conn. Mar. 19, 2012).  The New York litigation, 
after a hearing on standing issues before the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, was 
proceeding in the Southern District of New York, where Jacoby & Meyers filed a Second 
Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief, curing the standing 
issues, in June 2013. See Second Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, 
Jacoby & Meyers, LLP v. Schneiderman, No. 11-3387 (LAK) (S.D.N.Y. June 21, 2013).  A 
motion to dismiss remained pending. Cf. Reply Memorandum of Law in Further Support of 
Defendant’s Motion To Dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint, Schneiderman, No. 
11-3387 (LAK) (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2013), ECF No. 119. 
 120. Second Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief, supra 
note 119, ¶¶ 38–40. 
 121. Id. ¶ 41. 
 122. Id. ¶ 77. 
 123. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4 (2013). 
 124. See, e.g., David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 
799, 853 (1992) (“Independence arguments have always had a privileged status in 
professional discourse.  For example, the claim that there is an inherent link between the 
current disciplinary system and the status of lawyers as ‘independent professionals’ is firmly 
rooted in precedent, practice, and professional mythology.”); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 
OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 10(b) (2000) (“Those limitations are prophylactic and 
are designed to safeguard the professional independence of lawyers.  A person entitled to 
share a lawyer’s fees is likely to attempt to influence the lawyer’s activities so as to 
maximize those fees.  That could lead to inadequate legal services.”). 
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to the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers, “the concern is 
that permitting such ownership or direction would induce or require lawyers 
to violate the mandates of the lawyer codes, such as by subjecting the 
lawyer to the goals and interests of the nonlawyer in ways adverse to the 
lawyer’s duties to a client.”125  Yet, foreign jurisdictions allowing for 
nonlawyer ownership and investment in law practices have not experienced 
a flood of client complaints about a lack of lawyer professionalism, 
independent judgment, or other protection elements.126  Pressures related to 
revenue generation or time constraints, the sources of greatest concern for 
undue influence by nonlawyers, are equally, if not more present under 
accepted organizational structures such as the solo practice, partnerships, 
and limited liability partnerships.  A more cynical, though perhaps also 
more accurate, view is that the rhetoric of professionalism, independence, 
and protection are pretext for monopolistic protectionism designed to limit 
the availability of legal services and maintain the price of legal services at 
an artificially high level, thus preserving the status quo that has been so 
profitable for the lawyers who have created and enforced the regulatory 
structure in the past. 
An alternative reading of Rule 5.4 is to consider it as an organization or 
distribution rule, not a professional competence rule.  Looking beyond the 
characterization of professional independence—and instead examining the 
rule for what it bans, a particular form of business structure for law 
practices—reveals why the rule unconstitutionally restricts the free flow of 
legal information.  Under existing regulation, lawyers may only organize as 
sole proprietorships, partnerships, limited liability partnerships, limited 
liability companies, or professional corporations, all entirely owned by 
lawyers, thus removing the possibility for investment from outside sources.  
Model Rule 5.4 forecloses one of the most common and effective business 
structures designed to reduce the very concerns regarding professional 
independence that the Rule purports to address—the corporate form.127  
The corporation is designed to operate independently from the owners of 
the business (and their individual self-interest).  By providing owners with 
personal asset protection, the corporate form protects against decisions that 
one might make driven by personal financial motive and instead elevates 
the business’s best interest.  The corporate form also facilitates access to 
capital for investing in enhanced technology, branding and marketing, 
                                                                 
 125. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 10(c). 
 126. Australia adopted the Legal Profession Act in 2004, authorizing nonlawyers to own 
shares in Australian law firms.  Australian firm Slater & Gordon became the first publicly 
traded law firm in the world in May 2007. See Peter Lattman, Slater & Gordon:  The 
World’s First Publicly Traded Law Firm, WALL ST. J. (May 22, 2007, 9:19 AM), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2007/05/22/slater-gordon-the-worlds-first-publicly-traded-law-
firm/.  In 2007, England and Wales adopted the Legal Services Act, similarly facilitating 
nonlawyer ownership and investment in law practices. Legal Services Act, 2007, c. 29, 
§ 1(e) (Eng.).  Since the Act became fully effective in 2011, over 200 organizations have 
obtained licenses as alternative business structures to offer legal services at all levels of the 
market, including the consumer law market. 
 127. See generally Henry Hansman & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of 
Organizational Law, 110 YALE L.J. 387 (2000). 
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research and development, and expanded services.  While Rule 5.4 has been 
couched in terms of professional independence, the Supreme Court has long 
recognized that the corporate form, in and of itself, does not compromise a 
lawyer’s judgment.128  The Rule blocks methods for creating and 
disseminating legal information from a significant source—the 
corporation—absent a professional expertise justification.  In a post-Sorrell 
world, this seems no longer sustainable. 
B.  Unauthorized Practice of Law Statutes and Geographic Restrictions 
Following the Court’s 1963 decision in NAACP v. Button, commentators 
speculated that the Court would soon liberalize unauthorized practice of law 
restrictions to permit legal services offered by “lay intermediaries” beyond 
licensed attorneys.129  As it turns out, this was not to be.  It is a prospect 
worth revisiting especially given the plight of the consumer law market.  
Fifty years post-Button, Professor Elliott Cheatham’s observations 
suggesting conclusions from the Button decision prove prescient and 
enduring: 
[I]t seems likely that, as a result of the decision, lay intermediaries of 
varied sorts will shortly urge constitutional support for their activities.  
Consequently, it is all the more urgent that the bar reconsider its 
regulations for preventing professional abuses in the light of the new 
measures that are needed to bring legal services to the middle classes.130 
Model Rule 5.5(a) states, “A lawyer shall not practice law in a jurisdiction 
in violation of the regulation of the legal profession in that jurisdiction, or 
assist another in doing so.”131  The ABA has left to individual states to 
determine what precisely constitutes the practice of law, a definition that at 
best is imprecise and at worst is utterly indeterminable.132  The ambiguous 
                                                                 
 128. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428–29 (1963) (recognizing the First 
Amendment right of nonprofit corporations to provide legal services); see also Citizens 
United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010) (“[T]he Government may not suppress political 
speech on the basis of the speaker’s corporate identity.  No sufficient governmental interest 
justifies limits on the political speech of nonprofit or for-profit corporations.”). 
 129. Elliott E. Cheatham, A Lawyer When Needed:  Legal Services for the Middle 
Classes, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 973, 973, 985 (1963) (“Are organizations that furnish legal 
services protected by the federal constitution from condemnation as lay intermediaries by 
state laws or professional standards?  The question was recently made explicit by the 
Supreme Court of the United States in NAACP v. Button.”). 
 130. Id. at 986.  Cheatham is not the only scholar to make this recommendation. See, e.g., 
DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE:  AN ETHICAL STUDY 269 (1988) (arguing for 
deregulation of “the market for routine legal services—wills, probate, real estate closings, 
uncontested divorces, and so forth—by allowing nonlawyers and paralegals to perform 
them); Thomas D. Morgan, The Evolving Concept of Professional Responsibility, 90 HARV. 
L. REV. 702 (1977); Deborah L. Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly:  A 
Constitutional and Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34 STAN. L. 
REV. 1 (1981) (examining the bar’s unauthorized practice campaign and the related 
constitutional implications, arguing for alternatives to prioritize First Amendment and due 
process values). 
 131. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5(a) (2013). 
 132. See Catherine J. Lanctot, Does LegalZoom Have First Amendment Rights?:  Some 
Thoughts About Freedom of Speech and the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 20 TEMP. POL. & 
CIV. RTS. L. REV. 255 (2011) (examining the implications of challenging companies like 
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nature of the definition of law practice has led many to speculate upon the 
constitutionality of these restrictions for that reason alone.133  States 
generally “have drawn a distinction between giving generic legal 
information and giving personalized legal advice,”134 but beyond this have 
offered little guidance.  Currently, with very few exceptions, only licensed 
attorneys may engage in a wide-sweeping range of activities falling under 
“practice of law” and they may do so only in the particular state where 
licensed.135 
Setting aside the problematic nature of the definitional ambiguity, it is 
also complicated to assess how best to balance the free flow of legal 
information against the need to incentivize and protect professional 
judgment and disciplinary knowledge.  Adding to the complexity is the 
additional inquiry related to nonhuman law practice, i.e., self-help books 
and computerized legal forms.136  For example, does computer software 
that takes an individual through a decision-tree process for completing legal 
forms constitute the practice of law?  In many jurisdictions, the answer 
would be yes under existing unauthorized practice of law statutes, though 
legislative action has been taken in at least one state to make clear that it 
does not, provided that the software include a disclaimer that it is not a 
substitute for a lawyer’s services.137  The latter stance is in the spirit of an 
                                                                                                                                                     
LegalZoom and potential defenses to the charge of unauthorized practice of law from a First 
Amendment standpoint).  “A significant part of the [First Amendment] problem is the legal 
profession’s notorious inability to produce a principled definition of the practice of law.” Id. 
at 262. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 265. 
 135. Some states are in the process of assessing the merits of authorizing nonlawyers to 
perform certain services and tasks that currently require a law license.  For example, Chief 
Judge Jonathan Lippman of the New York Court of Appeals convened a task force in 2013 
to study this issue, and the New York City Bar Committee on Professional Responsibility 
issued a report recommending that trained nonlawyers be allowed to serve as advocates in 
some court and agency tribunals and also to advise on certain matters outside of tribunals. 
See N.Y.C. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Responsibility, Narrowing the “Justice Gap”:  
Roles for Nonlawyer Practitioners (June 2013), http://www2.nycbar.org/pdf/report/
uploads/20072450-RolesforNonlawyerPractitioners.pdf.  Even more proactive, the 
Washington Supreme Court recently adopted a rule allowing “limited license legal 
technicians” to perform some of these services and tasks. See WASH. ADMISSION TO 
PRACTICE R. 28.  While the Washington Court acknowledged that this rule likely would 
result in work previously done by lawyers to be taken over by nonlawyers, it prioritized the 
unmet need for informed advice.  The State Bar of California heard testimony about a similar 
type of proposal during the summer of 2013. See Limited License Working Group, 
ST. B. CAL., http://www.calbar.ca.gov/AboutUs/BoardofTrustees/LimitedLicenseWorking
Group.aspx (last visited Apr. 26, 2014).  According to a 2012 report conducted by the ABA 
Standing Committee on Client Protection, “[t]wenty-one jurisdictions authorize nonlawyers 
to perform some legal services in limited areas.” AM. BAR ASS’N STANDING COMM. ON 
CLIENT PROT., 2012 SURVEY OF UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW COMMITTEES REPORT 
(2012), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/
professional_responsibility/2012_upl_report_final.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 136. See, e.g., Katz, supra note 15. 
 137. See Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm. v. Parsons Tech., Inc., No. Civ. A. 
3:97CV-2859, 1999 WL 47235, at *4–7 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 22, 1999), vacated and remanded 
per curiam, 179 F.3d 956 (5th Cir. 1999); cf. Janson v. LegalZoom, 802 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 
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information-driven reading of the First Amendment because it facilitates the 
creation and dissemination of legal information yet preserves the market for 
disciplinary knowledge, because it conveys to the recipient that legal 
information does not substitute for legal expertise. 
Geographic restrictions also compromise the free flow of legal 
information created and disseminated by lawyers.  For example, an attorney 
who is expert in handling uncontested divorces licensed to practice in one 
state cannot do so in another if unlicensed.  Geographic restrictions wholly 
foreclosing the practice of law in a jurisdiction where one is not admitted do 
not, in and of themselves, cultivate or preserve professional expertise.  
Rather, geographic restrictions should be more narrowly drawn to correlate 
with the need to ensure appropriate knowledge of state law and procedure 
where familiarity with these nuances is necessary to deliver competent legal 
advice and representation. 
C.  Advertising and Antisolicitation Rules 
Constraints on advertising and solicitation are another area of lawyer 
regulation that deserves reevaluation in light of the Court’s heightened 
protection for the creation and dissemination of information.  Recall that a 
primary concern for the Court in Bates v. State Bar was “the right of the 
public as consumers and citizens to know about the activities of the legal 
profession.”138  The Court was at least as focused, if not more so, upon the 
public’s informational interests as it was upon the attorneys’ speech 
interests.  Under both an information-driven and democratic competence–
centered analysis, Bates was correctly decided, though this view is not 
necessarily uniformly shared.139 
After the Court struck down the wholesale ban on attorney advertising in 
Bates, it then turned its attention to restrictions on in-person solicitation of 
clients.  In 1978, the Court decided two cases involving lawyer solicitation 
of clients on the same day, one involving an ambulance chaser and the other 
involving a civil rights attorney.  The Court drew a line between the two 
cases regarding speech that can be regulated under the First Amendment.  
In Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n,140 the Court determined that the state 
could ban an ambulance chaser from in-person solicitation of injured 
victims to inform them of their potential liability damages, but in In re 
                                                                                                                                                     
1063–65 (W.D. Mo. 2011) (holding that LegalZoom’s legal document preparation service 
provided online constituted the unauthorized practice of law). 
 138. Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 358 (1977) (quoting In re Bates, 555 P.2d 640, 648 
(Ariz. 1976) (Holohan, J., dissenting)). 
 139. Justice O’Connor, for example, has made it known that she believes Bates was 
wrongly decided. See, e.g., Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 778 (1993) (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting) (“I continue to believe that this Court took a wrong turn with Bates v. State Bar 
of Arizona . . . and that it has compounded this error by finding increasingly unprofessional 
forms of attorney advertising to be protected speech. . . .  In my view, the States have the 
broader authority to prohibit commercial speech that, albeit not directly harmful to the 
listener, is inconsistent with the speaker’s membership in a learned profession and therefore 
damaging to the profession and society at large.”). 
 140. 436 U.S. 447 (1978). 
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Primus,141 the Court held that a lawyer for the American Civil Liberties 
Union (ACLU) could not be banned from in-person solicitation of women 
who had been sterilized to inform them of their constitutional rights.142  The 
Court endeavored to reconcile these decisions by looking to the fact that 
Ohralik was soliciting for his own financial gain, whereas the ACLU 
lawyer was offering services free of charge (though she still received a 
salary from the ACLU).  Under an information-driven understanding of the 
First Amendment, Ohralik should have been permitted to provide the legal 
information, even at the hospital bedside.  Whether this restriction upon 
solicitation holds up under principles of democratic competence is less 
clear, though a blanket restriction on attorneys from providing information 
about legal rights and entitlements in this way does not seem consistent 
with the preservation of disciplinary knowledge.  Instead, regulation should 
address, in a targeted way, the underlying concern at issue in Ohralik, 
which was not in-person contact from an attorney but rather undue 
influence upon a vulnerable prospective client. 
D.  Economic Theory and the Legal Information Market 
Economic theory supports this First Amendment analysis.  For example, 
economist and law professor Gillian Hadfield has deployed economic tools 
to assess what she believes is wrong with the distribution of legal services 
and, importantly, how to fix it, by exploring why the law market is not 
competitive.  She identifies three sources of the law monopoly as 
destroying competition:  (1) “state prohibition of the practice of law by non-
lawyers and limitations on the number of people admitted to law schools 
and the bar”; (2) “natural entry barriers to the practice of law—the 
increasing returns to human capital and scale, the limited opportunities to 
gain experience in procedures with decision makers, and natural limitations 
on the supply of individuals with the cognitive ability necessary to 
effectively engage in the complex reasoning of law and legal process”; and 
(3) “the state’s monopoly on coercive dispute resolution—only dispute 
resolution through the public courts can force the other party to the 
table.”143  Her solution is not complete deregulation proposed by some,144 
but what she calls “right-regulation,” i.e., regulation that  
would not only remove the barriers to the corporate practice of law and 
limits on the capacity for legal services to be provided by a much wider 
array of entities and individuals, [but] also expose suppliers of legal 
services to the consumer protection, professional negligence, antitrust, 
and other law that regulates ordinary markets.145 
                                                                 
 141. 436 U.S. 412, 437–40 (1978). 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 983. 
 144. See CLIFFORD WINSTON ET AL., FIRST THING WE DO, LET’S DEREGULATE ALL THE 
LAWYERS 82–94 (2011). 
 145. Gillian Hadfield, Right-Regulating Legal Markets, TRUTH ON MARKET (Sept. 19, 
2011), http://truthonthemarket.com/2011/09/19/gillian-hadfield-on-right-regulating-legal-
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Over three decades ago, Geoff Hazard, Russ Pearce, and Jeff Stempel 
similarly critiqued regulators as having “failed to appreciate that legal 
services are a market commodity.”146  As they explained, “[O]pponents and 
supporters of advertising have not fully recognized that advertising, by 
enabling the dynamics of normal market forces to operate on the delivery of 
legal services, may alter methods of supplying, as well as delivering, legal 
services.”147  Their observations remain true today, and have even broader 
applicability than the authors might have originally contemplated, bearing 
on the nonlawyer ownership and investment ban, the prohibition on 
multidisciplinary partnerships, and geographic restrictions.148 
CONCLUSION 
The economic arguments for liberalizing lawyer regulation to facilitate 
the free flow of information support the First Amendment analysis.  
Perhaps one state will bravely implement a regulatory structure to expand 
access to legal information without intervention by the U.S. Supreme Court.  
If not, as this Article has shown, many of the restrictions governing the 
organizational form of law practice and the distribution of legal services are 
constitutionally vulnerable to the extent they constrain the creation and 
distribution of legal information by lawyers absent a justification that 
enables or preserves the essence of the lawyer-client relationship. 
                                                                 
 146. Hazard, Pearce & Stempel, supra note 18, at 1087 (applying “basic market and 
economic theory to the production and consumption of legal services and demonstrat[ing] 
that lawyer advertising offers important advantages to consumers of legal services”). 
 147. Id. at 1093. 
 148. For further economic justifications supporting deregulation of the legal profession, 
see Benjamin Barton, Why Do We Regulate Lawyers?:  An Economic Analysis of the 
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